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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT: REVERSAL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE’S POSITION ON PHYSICIAN
ASSISTED SUICIDE AND THE ENSUING COURT BATTLE

INTRODUCTION
The concept of death confronts everyone at some point during his life.
Difficult decisions must be made when the prospect of dying is encountered.
For example, technological advances have extended life expectancy well
beyond what was thought possible only twenty years ago. Grandparents are
receiving hip replacement surgery, people are overcoming cancer, and the list
goes on and on. But, when is enough, enough? Medicine and technology
cannot be relied upon to extend our lives forever. The inevitable will occur
and that day has become the center of much attention.
Some individuals do not feel that their lives are worth living, or more to
the point of this article, that living has become too burdensome. Intolerable
pain, loss of autonomy, and negative affects on one’s family weigh heavily on
individuals as they approach death. Doctor Jack Kevorkian has said that, “You
can pass any law against assisted suicide and euthanasia and I will disobey
it. . .because it is immoral medically. When the law itself is intrinsically
immoral, there is a greater duty to violate the law.”1 Doctor Kevorkian’s
statement may represent one end of the spectrum, but it does raise an
interesting proposition. Can a terminally ill patient with full mental capacity
choose to die?
A person may take his own life without question. Physician-assisted
suicide, however, has sparked controversy throughout the world. After years
of heated debate, Oregon successfully passed the Oregon Death with Dignity
Act (the Act).2 The Act permits physicians to prescribe controlled substances
to qualified individuals so that the individual may take his own life.3 Oregon is
the only state in the United States, which permits physician-assisted suicide.
Maine, California, Michigan, and Arizona have all attempted unsuccessfully to
follow in Oregon’s footsteps. Amid protests and legal challenges, the Act has
prevailed to date, yet it now confronts its greatest challenge, the federal
government.
1. See The Hemlock Society USA, at www.hemlock.org/changing_laws.htm (last visited
April 20, 2002).
2. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800- 127.897 (1999).
3. Id.
377
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Attorney General John Ashcroft recently stated that DEA agents are
required to prosecute physicians in Oregon who perform physician-assisted
suicides.4 This is a departure from the decision by former Attorney General
Janet Reno who declared the Oregon Death with Dignity Act did not
necessitate a federal response. The day after the pronouncement by Attorney
General Ashcroft, the state of Oregon filed suit, challenging the ruling. The
ensuing court battle questions the purpose and scope of the Controlled
Substance Act and the validity of Attorney General Ashcroft’s ruling.
Possessing the requisite standing, Oregon will successfully challenge Attorney
General Ashcroft’s ruling on the grounds that it goes beyond the scope of the
Controlled Substance Act and it violates the principles of federalism set out in
the Constitution and reiterated by President Clinton in a 1999 Executive Order.
The argument in this Article proceeds as follows: Part I provides a brief
history of physician-assisted suicide and the Oregon Death with Dignity Act to
acquaint the reader with a general understanding of the issues on both sides of
the argument; Part II introduces important and relevant case law; Part III
discusses the effect of Attorney General Ashcroft’s pronouncement; Part IV
sets up the arguments on both sides of the current court battle; and Part V
explains why Oregon will be allowed to continue its practice of physician
assisted suicide.
I. THE OREGON DEATH WITH DIGNITY ACT
A.

History

The Oregon Death with Dignity Act (the Act), approved by voter ballot in
1994 and enacted in October 1997,5 legalized physician-assisted suicide for
competent, terminally ill persons residing in Oregon.6 The Act grants an
attending physician the authority to prescribe a lethal dose of medication to a
qualifying patient for the purpose of self-administration.7 A qualifying patient
must be a capable adult8 with a terminal illness9 who resides in Oregon.10

4. Memorandum for Asa Hutchinson, Administrator, The Drug Enforcement
Administration, from John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice Press Release
(Nov. 6, 2001).
5. See Attorney General Hardy Myers to Take Legal Action to Protect Oregon’s PhysicianAssisted Suicide Law, Dept. of Justice, available at www.doj.state.or.us/releases/rel110701.htm
(after the Act was approved by ballot in 1994 it was immediately challenged in the courts. This
prompted the Oregon legislature to put the Oregon Death with Dignity Act on the ballot again in
1997.).
6. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800 (1999).
7. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.815 (1999).
8. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800(3) (1999) (“in the opinion of a court or in the opinion of the
patient’s attending physician or consulting physician, psychiatrist or psychologist, a patient has
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Before the physician may prescribe the medication, the Act places a great deal
of responsibility upon her to guarantee that the patient has made an informed
and well thought out decision.
The physician must discuss with the patient, his medical diagnosis,
prognosis, and potential risks.11 Alternative options, like hospice care and
comfort care, must also be brought to the patient’s attention.12 These
safeguards are designed to ensure the patient understands his medical future so
the best decision regarding that future can be made. After the physician
discusses the procedure, all possible alternatives, and Oregon residency is
determined, a second physician is consulted to confirm that the attending
physician fulfilled her duties to the patient.13
If either physician feels it is necessary, the patient may also be referred to a
counselor14 for a determination as to whether or not the patient comprehends
the ramifications of his decision. If the counselor does not believe the patient
is capable of making an informed decision the patient will not be allowed to
proceed with physician-assisted suicide. Finally, the patient is encouraged to
contact next of kin15 and a waiting period gives the patient fifteen days to
contemplate his decision before a final decision must be made.16
The Act was designed to offer individuals an opportunity to take a more
active role in determining the outcome of their remaining life. Terminally ill
patients who feel there is no chance or opportunity for survival, are provided
the means to end their lives. The patient receives a medical prescription which
will end his life, instead of possibly enduring medical procedures that will
prolong death but inflict greater pain and discomfort. In essence, the Act was
initiated to provide terminally ill patients the opportunity to die as they had
live, with dignity.
B.

Scope and Effect of the Oregon Death with Dignity Act

the ability to make and communicate health care decisions to health care providers, including
communication through persons familiar with the patient’s manner of communicating if those
persons are available”).
9. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.800(12) (1999) (“an incurable and irreversible disease that has been
medically confirmed and will, within reasonable medical judgment, produce death within six 6
months”).
10. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.860 (1999).
11. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.815(c) (1999).
12. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.815(c)(E) (1999).
13. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.815(d) (1999).
14. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.825 (1999).
15. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.815(f) (1999).
16. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.840 (1999) (the patient must be given the opportunity to rescind his
request for physician-assisted suicide up until and including the day the final decision must be
made).
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By implication, the Act has been challenged theoretically on equal access
grounds. In 1999, a man diagnosed with amyotrophic lateral sclerosis
requested and received life ending medication from his physician.17
Controversy surrounded the event when the man had problems taking the
medication himself.18 Reports indicated that the man’s brother-in-law helped
him carry out the intended act.19 The brother-in-law remained tight-lipped
regarding his actions causing people to speculate about how he “helped” the
dying man.20 Because the body was cremated before an autopsy could be
performed, no one will ever know for sure the brother-in-law “helped.”21
Supporters of the Act say “there are no plans to attempt to expand the law
to allow lethal injections or other means so those with disabilities can access
the law [but] other’s [say] it is only a matter of time.”22 The fact remains that
neither active euthanasia, lethal injection, nor mercy killing are acknowledged
by the Act as acceptable means of physician-assisted suicide. Furthermore,
immunity from prosecution is only granted to those physicians complying in
good faith with the provisions of the Act.23 The Act does not protect
individuals from illegally assisting an individual’s suicide, nor was it intended
to. While the Act is open to challenge from the American with Disabilities
Act24 no such challenge has created a change in the Act’s original scope.
A study performed at the University of California in San Francisco, by R.
Jeffery Kohlwes, designed to evaluate physician responses to requests for
assisted suicide, showed “that patient requests for physician-assisted suicide
are a relatively common clinical occurrence.”25 How physicians deal with
such inquiries differs as much between physicians as it does between states.
No other state is as progressive as Oregon in terms of allowing physicianassisted suicide, therefore a comparison cannot be made, but Oregon’s Death
with Dignity Act has led to 69 Oregonians optioning for physician-assisted
suicide.26

17. Diane M Gianelli, Oregon Death Tests Assisted-Suicide Law, American Medical News,
Apr. 5, 1999, at 10.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Or. Rev. Stat. § 127.885(1) (1999).
24. This subject goes beyond the scope of this article.
25. R. Jeffery Kohlwes, Physicians’ Responses to Patients’ Requests for Physician Assisted
Suicide, THE J. AM. MED. ASS’N, June 12, 2001, at 2838.
26. See Oregon Death with Dignity, at http://www.dwd.org/pdf/odwd_report.pdf (last
visited April 20, 2002) (data is compiled from 1998-2000 statistics).
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According to an executive director for Compassion in Dying, the Act is
working exactly as the intended, without any failures and or abuses.27 In 1998,
only fifteen individuals accepted physician assistance to end their lives.28
“Some suggested that the numbers were lower than they otherwise may have
been because of the cloud in the form of proposed federal legislation – that
hung over the law for much of the year.”29 Despite the fear that the number of
people choosing physician-assisted suicide would increase dramatically, the
number has remained relatively constant.
In both 1999 and 2000, 27 people received medical assistance to end their
lives. In 2000, of those 27, the “median age was 69, and 21 had end-stage
cancer. All had health insurance, and 23 were in hospice care before their
deaths.”30 An inference can be drawn from this data that the majority of
persons requesting and receiving physician assistance in committing suicide,
were near the end of their lives in terms of both age and health, and they
possessed the means to continue receiving treatment via insurance had they
desired. This being the case, the system does not appear to be exploiting nor
taking advantage of persons seeking physician assistance.
Those opposed to physician-assisted suicide have enumerated a litany of
reasons detailing their opposition. The most prevailing concern is that the
doctor will advocate assisted suicide when she should be acting within the
traditional guidelines as a healer; this situation would potentially destroy the
doctor-patient relationship.31 Another fear is that the dual role thrust upon
doctors would lead to an increase in unnecessary deaths.32 Opponents also
believe “physician-assisted suicide would lead to a decreased incentive to
research and develop new methods of providing palliative care and life
sustaining treatments.”33
Proponents, on the other hand, advocate physician-assisted suicide for the
dignity and autonomy it can restore to a terminally ill patient at the end of his
life.34 They also believe that physician-assisted suicide should be available to
anyone capable of exercising free choice.35 The foundation of these beliefs is

27. Diane M. Gianelli, Oregon Suicide Report Contains Some Surprises, American Medical
News, March 8, 1999, at 9.
28. Id.
29. Id. (the Lethal Drug Abuse Prevention Act (H.R. 4006/S. 2151) would have hampered
physicians from practicing by taking away their DEA license if they performed physician-assisted
suicides).
30. Oregon Suicide Law Used by 27, Drug Topics, March 5, 2001, at 10.
31. Rena Patel, Physician-assisted Suicide: Is It Time?, 35 Cal. W. L. Rev. 2, 333 (1999).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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that a patient’s rights should outweigh all other interests.36 For example, when
first put on the agenda in Oregon, pain and suffering were the two biggest
reasons for legalizing physician-assisted suicide.37 Yet, of all of the persons
who died in 1998 from physician-assisted suicide in Oregon, only one of the
patients said pain control was a concern. Most cited concerns over loss of
autonomy or loss of control of bodily function.38
II. IMPORTANT AND RELEVANT CASE LAW
A.

Conflict between the States

Advocates believed that the combination of relatively low physicianassisted suicides and lack of reported abuses in Oregon would lead to the
adoption of similar statutes in other states.39 No state has yet adopted anything
resembling Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act. Some have tried, but they have
all failed. Although Oregon has opened the door to a major shift in health care
ethics, it has been a constant uphill battle for assisted-suicide proponents.
Five states did place physician-assisted suicide on the ballot, but each
initiative failed: Washington in 1992, California in 1993, Michigan in 1998,
and Maine in 2000.40 Beyond the above states, which put physician-assisted
suicide to a vote, 24 other states initiated bills that would have legalized it; the
measure failed in each state.41 State courts have also been less than supportive
of individuals seeking the same right to physician-assisted suicide as
experienced in Oregon.
In Sampson v State, Sampson and Doe, two mentally competent and
terminally ill persons, challenged Alaska’s criminal statute against physicianassisted suicide, alleging that their physicians should not be prosecuted under
the manslaughter statute for helping end their lives.42 The Alaska Superior
Court granted summary judgment against Sampson and Doe. The court
concluded that “the Alaska Constitution’s guarantees of privacy and liberty do
not afford terminally ill patients the right to a physician’s assistance in
committing suicide and that Alaska’s manslaughter statute did not violate
36. Id.
37. See The Hemlock Society USA, at http://www.hemlock.org/background.htm (last visited
April 20, 2002).
38. See Death with Dignity, at http://www.dwd.org/fss/impact.asp (last visited April 20,
2002).
39. Diane M. Gianelli, Will Oregon Data Spur Other States to Try Assisted Suicide?,
American Medical News, March 15, 1999, at 11.
40. See Death with Dignity Initiatives, at http://www.dwd.org/law/statutes.asp (last visited 420-02).
41. Gianelli, supra note 39, at 11.
42. Sampson v. State, 31 P.3d 88, 89 (Alaska 2001).
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Sampson and Doe’s right to equal protection.”43 The cry of personal autonomy
has not been enough to legalize physician-assisted suicide. Opposition has
fought advocates of legalized suicide at every turn and to the advocates’
dismay, increasingly harder.
The latest opposition has come in the form of anti-assisted suicide
legislation. In two unanimous decisions, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld
physician-assisted suicide bans in New York and Washington.44 In Vacco v.
Quill, the plaintiffs alleged that the ban on physician-assisted suicides violated
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
The plaintiffs
challenged the law based upon the premise that physician-assisted suicide was
comparable to withdrawing life-sustaining treatment.45
The Court ultimately reaffirmed its position that a distinction exists
between ceasing medical treatment and assisted suicide as enunciated in
Cruzan v. Director, MO Dept. of Health. In Cruzan, the Court concluded that
“[t]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected liberty
interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from [their]
prior decisions.”46 The Court’s doctrine enunciating a right to refuse treatment
is based on the notion that patients have a personal liberty right to freedom
from unwanted touching.”47
In Washington v. Glucksberg, the Court once again held that terminally ill
patients have no legal right to medical help in committing suicide.48 This
ruling prevented individuals in Washington from claiming a constitutional
right to physician-assisted suicide, but it did not adversely affect the Act. Nor
did the decision begin to resolve the moral and ethical questions many
Americans ponder physician-assisted suicide. Chief Justice William Rehnquist
wrote that the Court’s decision “permits this debate to continue, as it should in
a democratic society.”49 In her concurrence, Justice O’Connor insinuated that
the best result may occur if the debate takes place on the state level. She noted
that “States are presently undertaking extensive and serious evaluation of
physician-assisted suicide and other related issues.”50 In which case, “the . . .
challenging task of crafting appropriate procedures for safeguarding . . . liberty
interests is entrusted to the ‘laboratory’ of the States . . . in the first instance.”51

43. Id. at 95, 100 (both Sampson and Doe died before the case was decided).
44. Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
45. Vacco, 521 U.S. at 794-99.
46. Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278 (1990).
47. Id. at 278-279.
48. Washington, 521 U.S. 702.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 737 (citing 521 U.S. at 716-718).
51. Id. (citing Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 292 (1990) (Justice
O’Connor, concurring)).
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Case Law

For years, the medical profession attempted to prolong life through
medical means. Sometimes these efforts kept people alive longer than
otherwise natural. In 1976, the landmark case of In re Quinlan (Quinlan)
turned the tide toward accepting death as opposed to prolonging life as long as
possible.52 Twenty-one year old Karen Quinlan was put on life support by her
doctors after she stopped breathing; she remained in a permanent vegetative
state, supported only through the assistance of machines.53 A court battle
ensued when Karen’s father wanted to remove the machines keeping Karen
alive.54 Karen’s doctors and the hospital opposed this proposition as
interfering with medical judgment in route to murder.55
The New Jersey Supreme Court sided with Karen’s father, holding that
removal of life-sustaining technology is a constitutionally protected right.56
The court rationalized that the 14th Amendment would have allowed Karen as
a competent adult to relinquish her life.57 Unfortunately for Karen, given her
vegetative state, she could not give her consent to the physician. Considering
this situation, the court determined that a legal guardian would also possess the
right to reject life-sustaining technology for the patient.58 Later courts also
upheld similar cases on the basis of patient’s informed consent.59 The decision
in In re Quinlan marked a tremendous victory for end of life treatment.
Patients were given a larger say in how they were going to be medically treated
during the end of their lives. Starting with In re Quinlan, courts began to
recognize that patients possess an inherent right to consent to any and all
medical treatment.60 Included in a patient’s right to consent is also the right to
reject unwanted treatment. The Court, however, has drawn a distinction
between patient consent and assisted suicide.
Fourteen years later, the US Supreme Court recognized In re Quinlan and
other similar state court decisions in Cruzan v. Director, MO Dept. of Health.61
Cruzan was In re Quinlan all over again with the exception that Cruzan was
being tried before the US Supreme Court. Cruzan was in a vegetative state and

52. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ 1976).
53. Id. at 653-655.
54. Id. at 651.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 671.
57. Id. at 663.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209 (N.J. 1985); see In re Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332
(Minn. 1984).
60. Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ 1976).
61. Cruzan, 497 U.S. 261.
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received life-sustaining assistance with the help of medical technology.62 The
Court ruled that Cruzan was able to choose to reject or remove life-sustaining
assistance if she was competent or if her legal guardian agreed.63 The Court
did note that it was permissible for the state to require ‘clear and convincing’
evidence that the patient would be unable to live without technological
assistance before removal was permitted.64 The Court affirmed Cruzan in
1997, but it continued to prohibit assisted suicide. 65
III. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S POSITION
A.

Oregon’s Breakthrough

On June 5, 1998, then Attorney General Janet Reno issued a press release
detailing the Department of Justice’s position on Oregon’s Death with Dignity
Act. The press release stated that “the Department has conducted a thorough
and careful review of the issue of whether the Controlled Substance Act (CSA)
authorizes adverse action against a physician who prescribes a controlled
substance to assist in a suicide in compliance with Oregon’s Death With
Dignity Act.”66 The Department stated that as long as a physician adheres to
Oregon law, “adverse action” would not be sought against the physician.67
The strict guidelines and narrow circumstances under which physicians
may legally assist patient suicide convinced the Department the state of
Oregon was not acting in violation of federal laws.68 Further, “the Department
concluded that the CSA does not authorize DEA to prosecute, or to revoke the
DEA registration of, a physician who has assisted in a suicide in compliance
with Oregon law.”69 As long as physicians act in accordance with Oregon law,
the DEA has no grounds for prosecution; however, should someone stray from
these particular circumstances, prosecution may be sought. A few examples
include: “where a physician assists in a suicide in a state that has not
authorized the practice under any conditions, or where a physician fails to
comply with state procedures in doing so.”70

62. Id.
63. Id. at 262.
64. Id. at 261.
65. Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (Court held the right to refuse medical treatment did not
extend to the ingestion of poison).
66. Statement of Att. Gen. Reno on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act (on file with author)
(June 5, 1998).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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Setback

November 6, 2001 marked a dramatic change in the Attorney General’s
position on Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act. Citing a Supreme Court
decision, Ashcroft stated federal regulation of controlled substances, may not
be superceded by state legislation.71 “Upon review of the Oakland Cannabis
decision and other relevant authorities, [Ashcroft] concluded that the DEA’s
original reading of the CSA - that controlled substances may not be dispensed
to assist suicide - was correct.”72 The effect of this ruling would be to strip
doctors in Oregon of the ability to assist terminally ill patients in committing
suicide. Doctors who prescribe federally controlled substances to assist patient
suicide could have their DEA registration revoked or suspended.73 Revocation
or suspension of a doctor’s DEA registration prohibits him or her from
prescribing drugs, effectively eliminating the doctor’s ability to practice
medicine.74
Ashcroft’s position would effectively eliminate an Oregon doctor’s ability
to assist his or her patient in committing suicide by requiring DEA agents to
police and punish doctors who assist patient suicides by prescribing controlled
substances. Oregon was unique in allowing physician assisted suicide. No
other state in the entire United States allowed physicians to participate in
assisted suicides. Ashcroft knew Oregon would be the only state affected
when he reversed Attorney General Reno’s position. What affect does the
ruling have on Oregon? Oregon is currently challenging Ashcroft’s decision in
the federal courts.75
IV. THE ENSUING COURT BATTLE
Attorney General Ashcroft’s press release has raised several legal issues.
They include: whether Oregon has standing to challenge the Attorney
General’s position, whether the Controlled Substance Act applies to the current
situation, and whether federalism is being infringed upon. Each will now be
discussed in turn.
A.

Standing

71. U.S. v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001).
72. Memoradum for Asa Hutchison, supra note 4.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Oregon v. Ashcroft, No. 01-CV-1647, 65-66, (D. Ore. filed Nov. 7, 2001); see
http://www.dwd.org/pdf/transcript.pdf (a temporary injunction was issued by the District Court
of Oregon on November 8, 2001).
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Standing is required to litigate in federal court. Standing is composed of
three essential elements: an “injury in fact,”76 a “causal connection,”77 and the
injury complained of is likely to be redressed.78 The injury in fact must be
“concrete and particularized.”79 That is to say that there must be an invasion of
a legally protected interest and no citizen suits of general grievance are
allowed. The injury in fact must also be “actual or imminent.”80 For the
causal connection to be satisfied, “the injury must be fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant and not the result of some independent
action of a third party.”81 In order to be redressable, it “must be likely and not
speculative that the injury will be redressed by a favorable Court decision.”82
The injury Oregon alleges is an intrusion upon its sovereign and regulatory
interests. Oregon wants to protect its sovereignty by ensuring that its properly
enacted state laws remain free from federal encroachment.83 Oregon is also
fearful that the new position taken by the Department of Justice infringes upon
state regulatory interests by prohibiting Oregon’s Board of Medical Examiners,
Board of Pharmacy, and Department of Human Services from duly performing
their functions.84 Standing was granted in similar situations when existing
state statutes conflicted with new federal legislation. In New York v. United
States, the Court heard New York’s challenge of a new federal law.85 New
York challenged Congress’ ability to enact a federal law, which set guidelines
for the disposal of radioactive waste, where New York already had its own
policy.86 Similarly, in Ohio v. Department of Transportation, “since Ohio
[was] litigating the constitutionality of its own statute, duly enacted by the
Ohio General Assembly, Ohio [had] a sufficient stake in the outcome of this
litigation to give it standing.”87
This case may look like an example of parens patriae88 but it is not. On
the surface, the federal government is merely construing its own statute. If this
were the only reason for reconstruing the statute, Oregon would lack standing
76. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 561.
79. Id. at 560.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 562.
83. Ashcroft, No. 01-CV-1647, 5.
84. Id. at 6.
85. New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
86. Id. at 149.
87. Ohio v. Dept. of Transp., 766 F.2d 228, 232-33 (1985).
88. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447-48 (U.S. 1923) (“[with respect to the citizens of
a state and] their relations with the federal government . . . it is the United States, and not the
state, which represents them as parens patriae”).
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because it cannot inapropriately represent its citizens as parens patriae against
the federal government. Underlying the Department of Justice’s position is a
desire to invalidate the Oregon Death with Dignity Act. The Attorney
General’s reversal brings directly into question Oregon’s Death with Dignity
Act. Oregon is protecting its interest in the matter to ensure that its law
remains intact. While newly enacted federal laws often conflict with already
existing state laws the distinguishing factor here is that the Department of
Justice is making a complete switch from its previous position of allowing
physician assisted suicide. Because the Department of Justice has done a 180
degree reversal, Oregon should be afforded an opportunity to present its case.
Ensuring that the Act remains intact is not generalized, nor is it minute.
Peoples’ lives hang on the decision of the court. Oregon has a particularized
injury to allege.
The causal connection between the complained of injury and challenged
act need only be ‘fairly traceable.’ As noted above, the Attorney General’s
new position places the Act in a precarious situation. If a physician in Oregon,
adhering to the Act, prescribes controlled substances to assist a patient’s
suicide, she could now face criminal penalties. The Act’s new uncertainty
represents a distinct causal connection. And, a favorable decision would
restore certainty and ensure validity in the Act; hence, the injury alleged is
redressable.
B.

The Controlled Substance Act

The Controlled Substance Act (CSA) controls the manufacture and
distribution of controlled substances.89 Each substance is placed into a
schedule based upon its “medical use, potential for abuse, and . . . dependence
liability.”90 In order for a physician to handle controlled substances, she must
be registered with the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA).91 The DEA requires
record keeping and places quotas on schedule I and II92 substances to curb
unauthorized use.93 Civil and criminal penalties are imposed on persons
failing to strictly comply with the CSA.94 A physician’s DEA registration may

89. 21 U.S.C.A. § 801-971 (see also U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/agency/csa.htm).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See id. (Schedule I and II are highly addictive and represent the greatest potential for
abuse. Schedule II substance, however, possess some medical usage, while schedule I substances
possess none.).
93. Id.
94. Id.
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also be revoked if she participates in any criminal activities or jeopardizes
public safety.95
In discussing the scope of the CSA, Attorney General Reno said,
“The CSA was intended to keep legally available controlled substances within
lawful channels of distribution and use. It sought to prevent both the
trafficking in these substances for unauthorized purposes and drug abuse. The
particular drug abuse that Congress intended to prevent was that deriving from
the drug’s stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central
nervous system. There is no evidence that Congress, in the CSA, intended to
displace the states as the primary regulators of the medical profession, or to
override a state’s determination as to what constitutes legitimate medical
practice in the absence of a federal law prohibiting that practice. Indeed, the
CSA is essentially silent with regard to regulating the practice of medicine that
involves legally available drugs except for certain specific regulations dealing
with the treatment of addicts.”

The original ruling of the CSA, which Attorney General Ashcroft
advocates, is a hard line rule restricting the use of controlled substances for the
purposes of medical assistance. Doctors may administer controlled substances
to reduce the suffering of an individual in extreme pain, but she may not go so
far as to assist the patient in ending his life. Ashcroft’s position does nothing
to address what will become of patients whom suffer with tremendous pain
despite medical assistance. Drawing a well-defined distinction between life
and death is admirable, yet it fails to take into consideration the choice of the
patient.
It is true that the patient’s choice can not always be followed. In U.S. v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s Co-op, the Court held there was no medical
necessity exception to the prohibitions set forth in the CSA.96 In 1996,
California voters initiated a movement hoping “[t]o ensure that seriously ill
Californians have the right to obtain and use marijuana for medical
purposes.”97 The prohibitions set out in the CSA would no longer apply to
patients or physicians who fell within the proposed medical necessity
exception.98 Under the CSA, schedule I controlled substances may legally be
used in a government approved research project.99 The Court declined to
create a new exception, stating that “[w]hereas some other drugs can be
dispensed and prescribed for medical use,100, the same is not true for

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id.
532 U.S. 483 (U.S. 2001).
Id. at 480 (citing Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 11362.5 (West Supp.2001)).
Id.
Id. at 490.
See 21 U.S.C. § 829.
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marijuana.”101 The CSA does not recognize an accepted medical use for
marijuana.102
Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s Co-op is distinguishable from the case at hand.
The Act does not permit physicians to prescribe schedule I controlled
substances to patients. Rather it deals solely with schedule II controlled
substances. Schedule II controlled substances possess legitimate medical
purposes; for example, pain relief.103 The State of Oregon legalized physicianassisted suicide by a majority vote. In so doing Oregon has elevated
physician-assisted suicide to the level of a legitimate medical purpose. Barring
a change in legislation, the CSA does not prohibit the use of schedule II
controlled substances in physician-assisted suicide.
Furthermore, the Act is well designed and contains several safety
mechanisms. An individual can not merely walk in off of the street and
receive a physician’s assistance in committing suicide. The patient must have
an ongoing relationship with doctor, attend counseling sessions, seek a second
opinion, be determined to be a competent adult, and is encouraged to discuss
his decision with family and relatives. The Act does not encourage rash
decision-making, but fosters patient participation during his medical treatment.
Patients are given the right to make informed decisions regarding life and
death every day, why shouldn’t they be allowed to do the same here?
Attorney General Reno believed that the strict requirements of the Act
combined with public support elevated the Act to a level, which could not be
overlooked.
Merely classifying physician assisted suicide as murder
oversimplifies the issue. Continually administering pain medication to
terminally ill patients is not necessarily humane. If a patient decides that pain
medication does not help sustain a relatively normal way of life and decides to
stop accepting the medication, he may eventually die in extreme pain. The
patient is left between two alternatives, neither one of which may be appealing.
With the Act, the patient may ask for physician assistance to end his life. The
physician does not administer the medication, but merely prescribes it for the
individual. The citizens of Oregon have looked at both sides of this issue and
determined for themselves that the latter is the most humane approach. If
nothing else, the will of the people should not be cursorily overlooked.
C. Federalism Issues
An Executive Order issued by President Clinton on August 4, 1999, was
intended “to ensure that the principles of federalism established by the Framers
guide the executive departments and agencies in the formulation and
101. Oakland Cannabis Buyer’s Co-op, 532 U.S. at 491 (2001).
102. See 21 U.S.C. § 811.
103. Id.
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implementation of policies.”104 Explicit in the ideal of federalism is the notion
that local government is best suited to deal with issues falling outside a
national “scope or significance”105 and States retain any power not prohibited
by the Constitution nor enumerated to the federal government.106 If the
national government acts outside its enumerated powers a violation of
federalism shall occur.107
The Order continues by stating that “our
constitutional system encourages a healthy diversity in the public policies
adopted by the people of the several States”108 with an aim to foster “effective
solutions.”109 Solutions should be achieved through “cooperative effort,”110
with deference to the State when it’s policymaking authority is affected and the
“greatest caution” when constitutional issues surface.111
Article II of the U.S. Constitution vests in the President executive
Power.112 Executive Power includes the right to issue Executive Orders.
Executive Power is most effective when issued in conjunction with
Congressional legislation and weakest when conflicting with Congress.113 No
Congressional legislation specifically supports President Clinton’s Executive
Order, but the Constitution expressly states “[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”114 The Executive Order
clearly reiterates the distinction between powers set out in the Constitution for
the federal government and those for the States. The Executive Order also,
indicates that as a matter of policy the federal government should encourage
diversity amongst the States.
Considered alongside Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Washington v.
Glucksberg,115 the Executive Order implies that difficult public policies should
be left up to the individual States. And, if the federal government should
decide to intervene in an area of State diversity, it should do so cautiously and
with an eye toward cooperation. Attorney General Ashcroft’s ruling does not
foster an effective solution to the difficult issue of physician-assisted suicide.
It disregards the decision Oregon’s citizens made when they twice passed the
104. Executive Order 13132, 64 Fed. Reg. 43,255 (August 4, 1999).
105. Id. at (2)(a).
106. Id. at (2)(b).
107. Id. at (2)(g).
108. Id. at (2)(f).
109. Id.
110. Id. at (2)(h).
111. Id. at (2)(I).
112. U.S. CONST. art. II.
113. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
114. U.S. CONST. art. I.
115. Washington, 521 U.S. 702 (stating the proposition that certain public policies like
physician-assisted suicide should be left to “the ‘laboratory’ of the States”).
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ballot legalizing physician-assisted suicide. The ruling also oversteps its
constitutional bounds.
In Lopez v. United States, the Court determined that Congress possessed
the power to regulate three areas based upon the Commerce Clause.116 “First,
Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce.”117
“Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities
of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even
though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.”118 “Finally,
Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities
having a substantial relation to interstate commerce, . . . i.e., those activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.”119 Attorney General Aschcroft’s
ruling is an attempt to regulate an activity which has a substantial affect on
interstate commerce. If the federal law has a demonstrable “substantial
effect”120 the ruling will be constitutional.
Both Lopez and Morrison illustrate what is meant by a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. The Lopez Court declined to hold the Gun-Free School
Zone Act of 1990 constitutional.121 A high school senior was convicted of
violating the Gun-Free School Zone Act after he knowingly brought a handgun
into his high school.122 The Court holds that “[the Gun-Free School Zone Act]
neither regulates a commercial activity nor contains a requirement that the
possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce.”123 Substantial
effect requires more than unfounded and far-reaching fear that future students
will also bring handguns into school, destroying the classroom environment.124
In a similar case, U.S. v. Morrison, the Court declined to uphold the civil
remedy provision of a federal rape law.125
Like the Gun-Free School Zone Act and the federal rape law, Attorney
General Ashcroft’s ruling does not have demonstrable substantial effect on
interstate commerce. The purpose of the Commerce Clause is to regulate and
foster commerce between the several States. The ruling does not foster
commerce and only purports to regulate commerce on its surface. Even
assuming the ruling is valid, controlled substances will enter Oregon at roughly

116. 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995).
117. Id. (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964)).
118. Id. (citing Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern R Co. v. United States,
222 U.S. 20 (1911)).
119. Id. at 558-559 (citing Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 21 (1937).
120. Id. at 559.
121. Id. at 551.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 563-564.
125. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601-02 (2000).
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the equivalent rate as before, because very few individuals actually choose
physician-assisted suicide. If the ruling is regulating anything, it is regulating
the right to die, which is beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause. Attorney
General Ashcroft’s ruling violates the ideas set out within the Executive Order,
Article II of the Constitution and the Commerce Clause.
V. CONCLUSION
In the present case, Oregon is challenging a ruling by Attorney General
Ashcroft, which would permit DEA prosecution of physicians who prescribe
controlled substances too assist patients in committing suicide. In order to
reach the merits of its case, Oregon must show the court that it has standing to
bring its lawsuit. Oregon achieves this by alleging infringement upon its
sovereignty and regulatory interests. By bringing this suit, Oregon will
succeed in finding out whether or not the Attorney General’s ruling overrides
Oregon law. If it does not, the Act remains intact and the Department of
Justice is prevented from seeking criminal liability against physicians
practicing under the Act.
Proceeding to the merits of the case, the CSA does not prohibit physicians
from using controlled substances to assist patients in committing suicide. The
CSA specifically authorizes the use of schedule II controlled substances to be
administered to patients suffering from extreme pain and other legitimate
medical purposes. When the citizens of Oregon passed the Act, they
legitimized physician-assisted suicide. Hence, physicians are acting within the
scope and guidelines of the CSA when they assist patient suicide.
Federalism necessitates that the Act be free from egregious federal
oversight. The Constitution sets out enumerated federal powers, powers
prohibited from the states, and places the remaining powers in the hands of the
states or its people. Furthermore, the Executive Order by President Clinton
encourages cooperation between the federal government and state governments
when difficult policy concerns are at issue. Attorney General Ashcroft’s ruling
disregards the boundaries between what the federal government has the power
to regulate and what should be left to the individual States. An analogy can
best be drawn to the death penalty. States are divided on the issue of
administering the death penalty. In fact, of the Western world, the United
States is practically alone in its practice of the death penalty. Difficult moral
concerns have caused States to act in accordance to the wishes of their
individual citizens. President Clinton’s Executive Order implies the same
scenario applies to physician-assisted suicide. The federal government also,
cannot claim that it is regulating commerce under the Commerce Clause,
because what seems to be the real driving force behind the Attorney General’s
ruling is to invalidate the right to die.
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In conclusion, the right to die is not a constitutional right, but that does not
mean it is not a right. Attorney General Ashcroft cannot stop individuals from
committing suicide, yet he is attempting to prohibit physician-assisted suicide.
Is it more humane to prohibit physician-assisted suicide and prolong life by
administering medication to reduce the amount of pain and suffering one
undergoes, or is it more humane to allow physician-assisted suicide no matter
what our moral position is? I for one could not bear to see a loved one suffer
through incurable pain, yet I do not advocate physician-assisted suicide. I
believe that there must be a better option. But, that is my choice and someone
else may make a different decision, as did the voters of Oregon. The Act does
not allow every patient to receive physician assistance in committing suicide.
It requires that a relatively intense and scrutinizing process be carried out
before any controlled substances are prescribed. The system has created
safeguards to ensure that mentally capable adults are making the proper
decision. Oregon has withstood countless morality attacks through the legal
system and in the media during the past four years; it is time that Oregon be
recognized for taking a leading and progressive viewpoint toward end of life
care.
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